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Machinists Preemption Under the NLRA: A Powerful Tool
to Protect an Employer's Freedom to Bargain
Robert Rachar
The National Labor Relations Act (the "NLRA") sets up an extensive
scheme regulating the collective bargaining relationship between an employer and
a union. Although the government establishes procedures for collective
bargaining under the NLRA, it has absolutely no authority to mandate the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement. Such control "would violate the
fundamental premise on which the Act is based-private bargaining under
governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion
over the actual terms of the contract."' Moreover, in the seminal case of NLRB
v. Insurance Agents International Union,2 the Supreme Court held that unless
proscribed by Congress, the NLRA generally grants both the employer and the
union freedom to use their economic weapons in collective bargaining.'
This collective bargaining scheme is controversial. Various interest groups
believe the "balance of power" in collective bargaining has tilted too far towards
the employer." Moreover, strikes, lockouts, and the like engender substantial
economic and social hardship. Labor history, union violence, presidential
politics, the 80s takeover mania, and even religious needs influenced recent
attempts by government to alter collective bargaining. To protect the collective
bargaining process from such governmental action, the Supreme Court developed
Machinists preemption.
Part I of this article sets forth the three major types of preemption found
under the federal labor acts, the theoretical basis for Machinists preemption, and
the major limitations on Machinists preemption enunciated by the Supreme
Court. Part II reviews the recent-and sometimes surprisingly
expansive-application given Machinists preemption by the lower courts. An
excellent example of this later dynamic is the use of Machinists preemption to
enjoin President Clinton's Executive Order debarring federal contractors who hire
permanent replacement workers for strikers. Finally,.Part III analyzes from an
employer's perspective how Machinists preemption may be applied in various
contexts to specific Louisiana statutes.
Copyright 1998, by LOUIsIANA LAW REvIEw.
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I. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108, 90 S. Ct. 821, 826 (1970). See also Section
8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (West 1997).
2. 361 U.S. 477, 80 S. Ct. 419 (1960).
3. Id. at 486-501, 80 S. Ct. at 425-33.
4. For example, unions and their supporters have sought to overturn an employer's right to
hire permanent replacement workers because it allegedly upsets the balance, of power in bargaining
between labor and management. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 110, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 20-25 (1993).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Preemption Applicable to Collective Bargaining
The federal labor acts provide for three basic types of preemption related to
collective bargaining: Garmon and Machinists preemption under the NLRA and
Section 301 preemption under the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA").5
Garmon preemption arises from the structure of the NLRA, which not only
provides substantive rules but also creates an administrative agency, the National
Labor Relations Board (the "NLRB"), to implement the NLRA through detailed
procedures and proscribed remedies.' Garmon preemption is thus based on a
"primary jurisdiction" theory, that determination of whether conduct is an "unfair
labor practice" under the NLRA is for the NLRB. Accordingly, both state and
federal courts are "preempted"' from considering conduct that is either "arguably
protected or arguably proscribed" under the NLRA.' Moreover, Garmon
preemption prohibits states from adding to the remedies provided under the
NLRA. 9 Under the "compelling local interest" exception to Garmon preemp-
tion, however, states are allowed to regulate egregious misconduct such as
violence and threats,'" defamation (under an "actual malice" standard)," and
the intentional infliction of emotional distress."
5. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (West Supp. 1997).
6. See §§ 3-6 &.8-11 of the NLRA, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 153-56 & 158-161 (West 1993 & Supp.
1998).
7. Because "preemption" is based on the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, this term is
normally applied only in the context of limiting governmental action by the states. However, as at
least one court has noted, "preemption" under the NLRA is used as a "shorthand" for conflict
analysis and is applied to both state and federal action. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 83 F.3d
439, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
8. If protected, the state cannot proscribe the conduct; if proscribed as an unfair labor practice,
then the state cannot supplement the remedial scheme set forth in NLRA. The "arguable standard"
is used because it is for the NLRB to decide the issue in the first instance. For articulation of this
"primary jurisdiction" theory, see, e.g., San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 79 S. Ct. 773 (1959); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490.91,74 S. Ct. 161, 166
(1953). For articulation of the distinction between the "primary jurisdiction" basis for the "arguably
proscribed" prong and the additional constitutional supremacy basis for the "arguably protected"
prong, see, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego, 436 U.S. 180, 181, 98 S. Ct. 1745, 1749
(1978).
9. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dept. of Indus. v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 106 S. Ct. 1057 (1986)
(preempting state debarment statute that prohibited state from purchasing from companies found to
have committed unfair labor practices).
10. E.g., Auto Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 643-46, 78 S. Ct. 932,937-39 (1958); United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64, 74 S. CL 833, 837 (1954).
II. E.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Worker of Am. Local 114,383 U.S. 53, 61-65,86 S. Ct.
657, 662 (1966).
12. E.g., Farmer v. United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. Local 25, 430 U.S. 290,
97 S. Ct. 1056 (1977). See generally Patrick Hardin, The Developing Labor Law 1654-73, 1678-97
(BNA 3d ed. 1992) (collecting cases on "compelling local interest" exception).
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As detailed below, Machinists preemption is based on the notion that
Congress preempted the field to leave certain areas of labor-management
relations to "the free play of economic forces."" Unlike Garmon preemption
this is a substantive right "akin to a personal liberty"" enforceable under
Section 1983." In the Boston Harbor case,' 6 the Supreme Court concisely
described the difference between these two preemption doctrines: "When
we say the NLRA preempts state law, we mean that the NLRA prevents
a state from regulating within a protected zone, whether it be a zone protected
and reserved for market freedom, see Machinists, or for NLRB jurisdiction, see
Garmon." 7
Finally, Section 301 preemption is based on the principle that
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") is a matter of
federal common law; thus, state law is displaced with federal common law
in order to achieve uniformity." The standard is whether resolution of
the state law claim is substantially dependent upon the meaning of the
terms of a CBA-and thus preempted-or is resolved without having to
interpret the CBA, and thus "independent."' 9  Analyzed from a slightly
different perspective, a state law claim is preempted under Section 301
when the legal duty to act arises from the CBA.20 Because virtually all
CBAs have a grievance and arbitration procedure, 2' a finding of Section
301 preemption often results in dismissal of the claim for failure to
exhaust those procedures. 22
13. See infra notes 23-42 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 15.
15. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 110-13, 110 S. Ct.
444, 451-52 (1989) (Golden State II).
16. Building & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders and
Contractors of Mass./R.l., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 113 S. Ct. 1190 (1993) [hereinafter "Boston Harbor"].
17. Id. at 228, 113 S. Ct. at 1196.
18. 'E.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456-57, 77
S. Ct. 912, 918-19 (1957).
19. E.g., Allis Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,220,105 S. Ct. 1904, 1916 (1985) (bad
faith insurance claim based on insurance provided by CBA preempted); compare Lingle v. Magic
Chef, Norge Div., 486 U.S. 399, 407-10, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1882 (1988) (retaliatory discharge claim
not preempted). See generally Hardin, supra note 12, at 1697-1706 (collecting cases on Section 301
preemption).
20. See. e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 368, 110 S. Ct. 1904,
1909 (1990); Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. CL at 1911.
21. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at411, 108S. Ct. at 1884 n.1 (noting990/ofsampledCBAscontain
an arbitration provision).
22. Section 301 preemption often arises in the context of an employer asserting it as a defense
to a suit brought by an individual in state court under state law. Because Section 301 provides
"complete preemption," e.g., Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Intern. Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 558, 88 S. Ct. 1235, 1236 (1968), the employer may remove the
case to federal court and assert that the suit must be dismissed because the plaintiff failed to exhaust
the CBA's grievance and arbitration procedures. See. e.g., Reece v. Houston Lighting &-Power Co.,
79 F.3d 485, 486 (5th Cir. 1996).
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B. The Theory of Machinists Preemption
Machinists preemption originated in Lodge 76, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relation
Commission.23 In Machinists, during collective bargaining negotiations, the
union members engaged in a concerted refusal to work overtime. The NLRB
refused unfair labor practice charges because it found the conduct was permissi-
ble; however, the state board found it was not protected and enjoined." The
Supreme Court reversed, concluding Congress had "preempted the field" so as
to leave the conduct involved "to the free play of economic forces."" The
Insurance Agents case provided the doctrinal underpinning for this, preemp-
tion-other than for certain specific proscribed activities (e.g.,, secondary
boycotts) Congress meant for the parties to be able to use economic weapons to
resolve labor disputes: 6
"[R]esort to economic weapons should more peaceful measures not
avail" is the right of the employer as well as the employee, and the
State may not prohibit the use of such weapons or "add to an employ-
er's federal legal obligations in collective bargaining" any more than in
the case of employees. Whether self-help economic activities are
employed by employer or union, the crucial inquiry regarding preemp-
tion is the same: whether "the exercise of plenary state authority to
curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frustrate effective implemen-
tation of the Act's processes.""
The Court also emphasized that the NLRA prevents states or other governmental
entities from imposing their view of "properly balanced" bargaining power:
[N]either States nor the Board is "afforded flexibility in picking and
choosing which economic devices of labor and management shall be
branded as unlawful. Rather, both are without authority to attempt to
"introduce some standard of properly 'balanced' bargaining power, or
to define "what economic sanctions might be permitted negotiating
parties in an 'ideal' or 'balanced' state of collective bargaining." To
sanction state regulation of such economic pressure deemed by the
23. 427 U.S. 132, 96 S. Ct. 2548 (1976) [hereinafter Machinists]. For a more recent example
of the Court's application of Machinists preemption, see Golden State Transit v. City of Los Angeles,
475 U.S. 608, 106 S. Ct. 1395 (1986) (Golden State 1). In Golden State 1, the city council
conditioned renewal of a cab franchise on settlement of a strike. Id. at 610-11, 106 S. Ct. at 1396-
97. The Court held that this action was preempted because it interfered with "the free play of
economic forces"-i.e., it limited the employer's ability to hold to its position by withstanding the
strike. Id. at 615-20, 106 S. Ct. at 1398-1401.
24. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 135-36, 96 S. Ct. at 2550-51.
25. Id. at 140, 96 S. Ct. at 2553.
26. Idat 136-51, 96 S. Ct. at 2551-58.
27. Id.. 147-48, 96 S. Ct. at 2556-57 (citations omitted).
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federal Act "desirabl[y] left for the free play of contending economic
forces .... is not merely [to fill] a gap [by] outlaw[ing) what federal
law fails to outlaw; it is denying one party to an economic contest a
weapon that Congress meant him to have available."28
As noted, the doctrinal basis for Machinists is the Insurance Agents
case-the "economic warfare" view of collective bargaining. Under this view,
Congress left a zone of activity to the "free play of economic forces" unless the
activity is specifically proscribed by Congress (such as secondary boycotts by
unions).29 Some examples of the type of conduct "permitted"-though not
necessarily "protected" 3 -- by the NLRA include an employer's ability to
lockout employees" or hire permanent replacements for economic strikers,32
and a union's ability to engage in work slowdowns." In Insurance Agents
itself, the union, during bargaining negotiations, implemented a "work without
a contract" program, which consisted of harassing activity such as (i) work
slowdowns; (ii) temporary sit-ins; (iii) picketing and passing out leaflets; and (iv)
demonstrations at the home office. 4 The NLRB held that, since this conduct
was not a protected strike under the NLRA, it constituted the failure to engage
in "good faith" bargaining and was thus proscribed."
The Court reversed, holding that the union's tactics are part of the free play
of economic forces allowed by the NLRA 6 The Court based this holding on
four principles underlying the NLRA: (i) Congress in Section 8(d) of the NLRA
explicitly provided that neither party to a CBA can be compelled to agree to a
proposal or to make a concession;"7 (ii) collective bargaining is premised on the
28. Id. at 148-50, 96 S. Ct. at 2557-58 (citations omitted).
29. See Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4) (West 1993) and Section 303
of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (West 1997) (providing a private cause of action against unions for
secondary boycotts).
30. As explained in the text above, the Machinists case arose out of the need to prevent
regulation in an area Congress meant to leave unregulated as either "protected" or "proscribed"
conduct under the NLRA. See Machinists, 427 U.S. at 141-47, 96 S. Ct. at 2554-57. Thus, this type
of conduct, although not "protected" under the NLRA, is nonetheless "permitted." This is more than
a difference in semantics. If the conduct were "protected" under the NLRA, then any adverse action
taken in response (e.g., firing a worker who engaged in a work slowdown) may be an unfair labor
practice. See Section 8(a)(I) & (bXl) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § I 58(a)(I) & (b)(1) (West 1993).
31. E.g., American Ship Bldg. Co.v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 85 S. Ct. 955 (1965).
32. E.g., NLRB v. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. 333, 345-46, 58 S. Ct. 904, 911-12 (1938);
Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (collecting cases).
33. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 80 S. Ct. 419 (1960). See generally
Hardin, supra note 12, at 685-691 (setting forth economic weapons employers and unions can use
in collective bargaining).
34. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 480-82, 80 S. Ct. at 422-23.
35. Id. at 480-84, 80 S. Ct. at 422-24.
36. Id. at 499-500, 80 S. Ct. at 432-33.
37. Id. at 485-87, 80 S. Ct. at 425-26.
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use of economic weapons by the parties to pressure agreement;3 (iii) activities
can be unprotected by the NLRA while not proscribed as an unfair labor
practice-either party is able to use economic pressure in this zone (e.g., work
stoppages, fire or discipline workers) to resolve;39 and (iv) government is not
allowed to regulate this conduct based on some notion of the proper "'balance of
power" in collective bargaining.' In Insurance Agents, the Court also articulat-
ed the basis for the "economic warfare" view of collective bargaining:
It must be realized that collective bargaining, under a system where the
Government does not attempt to control the results of negotiations,
cannot be equated with an academic collective search for the truth-or
even with what might be thought to be the ideal of one: The par-
ties-even granting the modification of views that may come from a
realization of economic interdependence-still proceed from contrary
and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest.
The system has not reached the ideal of the philosophic notion that
perfect understanding among people would lead to perfect agreement
among them on values. The presence of economic weapons in reserve,
and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel
of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized.
Abstract logical analysis might find inconsistencybetween the command
of the statute to negotiate toward an agreement in good faith and the
legitimacy of the use of economic weapons, frequently having the most
serious effect upon individual workers and productive enterprises, to
induce one party to come to terms desired by the other. But the truth
of the matter is that at the present statutory stage of our national labor
relations policy, the two factors-necessity for good-faith bargaining
between parties, and the availability of economic pressure devices to
each to make the other party incline to agree to one's terms-exist side
by side."'
Economic theorists and those engaged in the practical aspects of collective
bargaining also realize the wisdom of this "no governmental interfer-
ence/economic warfare" approach to collective bargaining. Economic theory
suggests as long as the legal rules allow the parties to determine the ultimate
terms of the contract, the bargainers will achieve economic efficiency through
bargaining by maximizing their relative preferences. 2 Economic theory also
teaches, however, that strategic behavior such as posturing and the like can
38. Id. at 487-92, 80 S. Ct. at 426-28.
39. Id. at 492-95, 80 S. Ct. at 429-30.
40. Id. at 492-500, 80 S. Ct. at 428-33.
41. Id. at 488-89, 80 S. Ct. at 426-27.
42. See. e.g., Stewart J. Scwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72 Cornell L.
Rev. 245, 257-61 (1987).
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interfere with this efficiency by hiding the true preferences of the parties." The
costs associated with economic warfare helps to force disclosure of these
preferences. And, when the parties have a good understanding of each other's
relative strengths and weaknesses (as is often the case in collective bargaining),
the credible threat of economic warfare may itself be enough to disclose those
preferences.
C. Limitations on Machinists Preemption
Machinists preemption read to its logical limit would be broad indeed. The
rule that parties may set the terms of the CBA free of governmental interference
could be construed to preempt the myriad state laws setting minimum standards
for employment. Likewise, the notion that parties are free to engage in economic
warfare could be read to mean general state contract and tort law cannot be
allowed to interfere with this process. The Court did not so rule. In subsequent
cases, the Court recognized three major limitations on Machinists preemption:
"minimum labor standards," "background law," and "market participant." '44
i. "Minimum Labor Standards" Exception
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,'45 the Court considered
a state statute setting forth minimum terms of insurance for employer health
plans." The insurance companies argued that the NLRA left the parties free to
set contract terms; thus, a state statute setting those terms ought to be preempted
by Machinists. The Court agreed there was "a surface plausibility" to this
argument, but nonetheless rejected it. First, the Court noted that the NLRA is
primarily concerned with the process, not the substance, of collective bargain-
ing.47 Second, the Court observed that the NLRA has never been construed to
restrict the application of federal laws setting minimum labor standards." The
Court then concluded that there was generally no reason to treat state minimum
labor standards differently:
Minimum state labor standards affect union and nonunion employees
equally, and neither encourage nor discourage the collective-bargaining
processes that are the subject of the NLRA. Nor do they have any but
the most indirect effect on the right of self-organization established in
the Act. Unlike the NLRA, mandated-benefit laws are not laws
designed to encourage or discourage employees in the promotion of
43. Id. at 269-71.
44. See infra notes 45-72 and accompanying text.
45. 471 U.S. 724, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985).
46. Id. at 725-28, 105 S. Ct. at 2382-83.
47. Id. at 754, 105 S. Ct. at 2396.
.48. Id. at 754-55, 105 S. Ct. at 2397.
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their interests collectively; rather, they are in part "designed to give
specific minimum protections to individual workers and to ensure that
each employee covered by the Act would receive" the mandated health
insurance coverage."9
The Court followed up on the "minimum labor standards" exception in the
"opt out" cases of Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne" and Livadas v.
Bradshaw.5 In Fort Halifax, a Maine statute required a one-time severance
payment upon closing of a plant unless the parties have "opted out" by having
their own severance plan in a CBA.5 2 Applying the reasoning of Metropolitan
Life, the Court found this statute easily passed muster: "If a statute that permits
no collective bargaining on a subject escapes NLRA pre-emption, see Metropoli-
tan Life, then one that permits such bargaining cannot be pre-empted." '" In
Livadas, however, the Court recognized "minimum labor standards" legislation
is not per se lawful but instead requires individualized review of the statute's
effect on collective bargaining.' In this case the state statute required prompt
payment of wages upon discharge. The state administrative policy, however,
excluded from coverage any employees who were covered by a CBA having an
arbitration provision." The Court held that this policy was preempted because
it interfered with collective bargaining by requiring a "harsh choice" by
employees of protection of minimum standards legislation or entering into
collective bargaining.56 The Court distinguished Fort Halifax because there the
statute (like virtually all opt-out statutes) required agreement on the terms at
issue to "opt out" of the minimum standards."
2. The "Background Law" Exception
The "minimum labor standards" exception addresses state laws designed to
regulate the workplace. States, of course, also have a large body of general tort
and contract laws that can impact the workplace and collective bargaining. The
Court addressed how Machinists preemption applies to these types of laws in
Beknap v. Hale. 8 In this case strike replacements brought misrepresentation
and tort claims based on state law. They claimed the employer told them they
were permanent replacements and would not be fired to make room for returning
49. Id.
50. 482 U.S. 1, 107 S. Ct. 2211 (1987).
51. 512 U.S. 107, 114 S. Ct. 2068 (1994).
52. Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 3-4, 107 S. Ct. at 2213-14.
53. Id. at 23, 107 S. Ct. at 2223.
54. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
55. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 110, 114 S. Ct. at 2071.
56. Id. at 116-17, 114 S. Ct. at 2074-75.
57. Id. at 132, 114 S. Ct. at 2082.
58. 463 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 3172 (1983).
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strikers. In the strike settlement involving the NLRB, however, the employer
had agreed to hire back strikers, which required the company to get rid of the
replacement workers. 9 The employer argued, inter alia, that these claims were
preempted under Machinists because they interfered with the employer's ability
to hire replacement workers." The Court disagreed:
Arguments that entertaining suits by innocent third parties for breach of
contract or for misrepresentation will "burden" the employer's right to
hire permanent replacements are no more than arguments that "this is
war," that "anything goes," and that promises of permanent employment
that under federal law the employer is free to keep, if it so chooses, are
meaningless. It is one thing to hold that the federal law intended to
leave the employer and union free to use their economic weapons
against one another, but is quite another to hold that either the employer
or union is also free to injure innocent third parties without regard to
the normal rules of law governing those relationships.6'
The Court further observed that (i) the employer may protect itself from strike
settlements by conditioning the offer of employment on settlement or NLRB
order; and (ii) such conditioning should not negate these employee's status as
"permanent replacements" under the NLRA.6 2
3. The "Market Participant" Exception
The Court first considered the "market participant" exception in a Garmon
preemption case. In that case, Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor &
Human Relations v. Gould, Inc.,6 Wisconsin had passed a "debarment" statute
preventing the state from purchasing from companies found to have committed
unfair labor practices." The Court ruled that this statute was preempted under
Garmon because the state was attempting to supplement the remedies provided
by the NLRB under the NLRA.65 Wisconsin nonetheless argued preemption
should not apply when the state is merely acting in the role of a "market
participant"--not a regulator-in purchasing goods. The Court held that,
regardless of whether there is a "market participant" exception to NLRA
preemption, it would not apply here because of (i) the state's unique position of
59. Id. at 493-97, 103 S. Ct. at 3174-76.
60. Id. at 499, 103 S. Ct. at 3177.
61. Id. at 500, 103 S. Ct. at 3178. Many economists would also contend that refusing to
enforce such contracts would create an even greater burden on the employer's right, because this
would make the employer's contractual promise of permanent employment of no value to prospective
employees.
62. Id. at 503-04, 103 S. Ct. at 3179 & n.8.
63. 475 U.S. 282, 106 S. Ct. 1057 (1986).
64. Id. at 283-85, 106 S. Ct. at 1059-60.
65. Id. at 286-88, 106 S. Ct. at 1061-62.
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power; and (ii) the state's only reason for acting was to punish conduct.'
"[F]or all practical purposes, Wisconsin's debarment scheme is tantamount to
regulation."67
In the Boston Harbor"8 case, the Court subsequently held that the
"market participant" exception does apply to preemption under the NLRA.
In Boston Harbor, the state agency on a large construction project entered
into a pre-hire project labor agreement requiring the use of only union
labor with an attendant ten-year no-strike commitment. All contractors on
this project had to agree to be bound by this project agreement.69 A
contractor group sued, arguing that the project agreement was preempted
under Garmon and Machinists.
The Court disagreed, concluding first that there is a "market participant"
exception to NLRA preemption. The Court then distinguished this case from
Gould by finding that the state had a legitimate, proprietary purpose for acting:
to complete the project as quickly as possible by avoiding labor problems."
The Court also noted that the pre-hire agreement at issue was lawful under the
NLRA when used by private actors; thus, the state was merely being allowed to
participate freely in the marketplace to the same extent as other "market
participants.""
66. Id. at 286-90, 106 S. Ct. at 1061-63.
67. Id. at 288, 106 S. Ct. at 1062.
68. Building & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders of MassJR.I.
Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 113 S. Ct. 1190 (1993).
69. Id. at 221, 113 S. Ct. at 1192-93.
70. Id. at 227, 113 S. Ct. at 1196.
71. Id. at 229-39, 113 S. Ct. at 1197-98.
72. Id. at 229-31, 113 S. Ct. at 1197-99. For some recent examples of the application
of the "market participant exception" see Alameda Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Oakland, 95
F.3d 1406 (9th Cir. 1996) and Colfax Corp. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 79 F.3d
631 (7th Cir. 1996). In Alameda Newspapers, the city council, because of a bitter labor
dispute between the newspaper and union, canceled its own subscriptions to and advertising
in the newspaper and issued a resolution urging the public to boycott the paper. Alameda
Newspapers, 95 F.3d at 1409-11. The Ninth Circuit held that the speech urging others to boycott
the newspaper was not preempted; it was not regulatory or coercive but merely an expression of the
city's views, a core feature of democracy. Id. at 1414-15. The Ninth Circuit held that the city's
participation in a boycott by canceling subscriptions (total of 13) and advertising (about $40,000 a
year) was, under these circumstances, also not preempted; the limited economic effect meant that the
city action's were not "regulatory" nor would they affect the economic balance of power. Id. at
1416-18.
In Co/fax, the state required the contractor on a construction project to enter into area-wide CBAs
(not merely project CBAs) with unions in order to work on a state construction project. Colfax, 79
F.3d at 632-33. The Seventh Circuit held that this was not preempted under Machinists because it
fell under the Boston Harbor "market participant" exception: The NLRA allows a private party in
the construction industry to enforce "no non-union firms" agreements. Id. at 634-35. In addition,
like in Boston Harbor, the state here had a legitimate interest as owner in maintaining labor peace
on its projects and knew of the prior conflicts between Colfax and unions over Colfax's non-union
status. Id. at 635.
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II. APPLICATION BY LOWER COURTS
As noted, the "no governmental interference/economic warfare" scheme of
collective bargaining set up by the NLRA is controversial. Because of this
scheme's substantial effect on society, various governmental actors-from the
President to local city councils-have tried directly and indirectly to affect
collective bargaining. Machinists preemption has thus been called into action in
numerous contexts, from blocking an executive order by the President, to
allowing an employer to dock the wages of workers in a run-of-the-mill private
dispute." This section reviews how the lower courts have applied Machinists
preemption in these different contexts.
A. The "No Permanent Replacement" Executive Order
The NLRA grants employers the right to hire permanent replacement
workers for economic strikers.7 Unions have fought repeatedly and unsuccess-
fully to have this right overturned. The most recent failure was the 1993
"Workplace Fairness Act," which Congress refused to pass. 7" Instead of another
futile attempt to change the NLRA, the unions got President Clinton to attempt
an "end run" around Congress by issuing an Executive Order debarring federal
contractors who hire permanent replacements.76 Fortunately for employers, in
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Reich,"' this Executive Order ran
afoul of Machinists preemption.
In Chamber of Commerce, the court first observed that the Executive Order
explicitly addressed labor policy, i.e., the order stated that the hiring of
permanent replacement workers upsets the "balance" in collective bargaining.
According to the Executive Order, this has deleterious effects on labor relations
that adversely impact the employer's ability to provide goods and services to the
federal government. 78 The court next noted the tremendous effect this Execu-
tive Order would have on labor policy: federal procurement exceeds $400 billion
73. By its very nature Machinists preemption is routinely implicated in major labor disputes
and in attempts to "correct" the balance of power in collective bargaining. For an interesting
discussion of how Machinists preemption could have been used in the major league baseball strike,
see Peter F. Giamporcaro, No Runs. No Hits, Two Errors: How Maryland Erred in Prohibiting
Replacement Players From Camden Yards During the 1994-95 Major League Baseball Strike, 17
Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 123, 140.43 (1996) (arguing Machinists preemption would have preempted
Maryland's anti-replacement players legislation).
74. E.g., NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333,34546, 58 S. Ct. 904, 910-
11 (1938); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(collecting cases).
75. See Chamber of Commerce, 74 F.3d at 1325.
76. See, e.g., Resolutions Adopted by AFL-CIO Special Convention March 25. 1996, BNA
Daily Labor Rep. at E4 (March 26, 1996).
77. 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
78. Id. at 1324.
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a year and constitutes approximately 6.5% of the GNP; moreover, approximately
22% of the labor force works for federal contractors.79 The court concluded
that, based on these broad effects and stated purpose, this Executive Order was
"tantamount to regulation" preempted under Machinists because of its interfer-
ence with collective bargaining."0 On panel rehearing, the court stated
Machinists does not preempt any governmental action that may have an effect
on the bargaining relationship; rather, it preempts governmental action (like this
Executive Order) that is predicated on implementing a substantive policy
regarding the proper balance in collective bargaining." Over a dissent, the
panel also concluded NLRA preemption is a shorthand for "conflict" analysis that
may also be applied to federal action.' 2
B. "Minimum Labor Standards" Statutes in Context
The Court in Metropolitan Life made it clear that, as a general matter,
Machinists preemption does not preempt state statutes establishing minimum
labor standards.' 3 Nonetheless, lower courts have found that in certain contexts
state statutes and actions setting standards are either (i) not "minimum labor
standards" statutes, or (ii) they may be preempted because of the unique context
of the case. 4 An example of this first approach is Bechtel Construction, Inc.
v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America.'" In Bechtel, the
company and union negotiated a 15% cut in apprentice wages, which brought
those wages below rates established by a state agency.' The court held that
these state apprentice wage rates were preempted. First, they did not constitute
a "state minimum" standard because the statute itself provided wages shall be in
accordance with those in the CBA. Second, enforcing them would unduly harm
the collective bargaining process because it would involve the state agency in
approval of the negotiated rates.' 7
The Pitta and Barnes cases demonstrate that even "minimum labor
standards" statutes may be preempted when they interfere with the "heart"
of the collective bargaining process."s In Pitta v. Hotel Waldorf-Astoria
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1332-39.
81. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Reich, 83 F.3d 439, 440-41 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
82. Id. at 441. Cf. id. at 442-43 (Wald, J., dissenting from denial of en banc consideration)
(observing that preemption analysis is logically and legally based on the Supremacy Clause; thus it
should apply only to federal-state relations, not federal-federal).
83. Metropolitan Lyfe, 471 U.S. at 754-55, 105 S. Ct. at 2397.
84. See infra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
85. 812 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1987).
86. Id. at 1221-22.
87. Id. at 1222-26.
88. Courts also, however, have upheld these types of statutes based on the rationales in
Metropolitan Life and the "opt out" cases of Fort Halifax and Livadas. See. e.g., Contract Servs.
Network, Inc. v. Aubry, 62 F.3d 294, 27-99 (9th Cir. 1995) (California law requires employers to
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Corp., 89 employees at the direction of the union engaged in a partial work
stoppage by each day refusing to clean two rooms. In response, the employer
docked their wages and an arbitrator upheld this action." The union filed suit
seeking to overturn this decision because it violated a state wage statute
preventing any docking of wages. 9' The court held that application of this
statute was preempted under Machinists because it interfered with the "self-help"
remedy by the employer:
The ability of an employer to deny payment to an employee who is a
mixed piece-rate/time worker, for work willfully not done at the
direction of his union, must be considered to be an activity meant to be
unregulated and left to the control of the free play of economic
forces. 92
In Barnes v. Stone Container Corp., 3 Montana had a "wrongful discharge"
statute that prohibited a discharge unless it was for "good cause" with an "opt
out" for those covered by a CBA." After the CBA terminated and while
bargaining was ongoing, an employee allegedly engaged in harassment of
replacement workers and was terminated.' The employee subsequently filed
suit under the statute. The court held that this statute was preempted under
Machinists because it interfered with the bargaining of the parties by imposing
a key term on the employer during bargaining; the "minimum labor standards"
exception was not applied because of the importance of the term involved td the
collective bargaining process:
Unlike the unemployment compensation in New York Telephone and the
health benefits in Metropolitan Life, we view the imposition of a just
cause term by the WDA on the parties negotiating a contract as
meddling at the heart of the employer-employee relationship at a time
when such interference is most harmful. Issues of hiring and firing are
often central to CBA negotiations and the NLRA, as interpreted in
provide worker's compensation coverage through a separately administered employee benefit plan;
Held not preempted under Machinists because it was simply "minimum standards" legisla-
tion-backdrop of legal protections against which collective bargaining occurs); Viceroy Gold Corp.
v. Aubry, 75 F.3d 482, 485-89 (9th Cir. 1996) (California statute prohibited mine workers from
working more than eight hours a day, with limited "opt out" for CBA to allow negotiated terms of
up to twelve hours a day; Held under Livadas narrow opt-out provision allowed under NLRA and
Machinists doctrine); NBC Inc. v. Bradshaw, 70 F.3d 69, 71-73 (9th Cir. 1995) (state overtime
statute had opt-out for CBA but was applied during impasse period; Held regular minimum standards
legislation with approved CBA type opt-out).
89. 644 F. Supp. 844, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 847.
92. Id. at 849.
93. 942 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1991).
94. Id. at 690-93.
95. Id, at 690.
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Machinists, intended to allow parties to resolve these matters without
the unsettling effect of state regulation.
96
C. "No Police Involvement" Statutes and Policies
The "economic warfare" of strikes, lockouts, and the like has a long history
of violence. This economic warfare and violence is also a highly-charged issue
politically, with local and federal government at various times throughout history
becoming heavily involved in supporting one side or the other to the labor
dispute. This involvement led to substantial restrictions on a court's ability to
enjoin conduct involved in "labor disputes" through passage of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act for the federal government97 and the "Little Norris-LaGuardia
Acts" for various states.98 Because of this history and the political atmosphere
created, police also have sometimes been hesitant to get involved in labor
disputes.. This "hands off' approach came to a head in the Rum Creek I" and
Rum Creek Il"l' cases addressing state statutes and policies enacted in response
to the notorious mine worker labor disputes in West Virginia.
In Rum Creek I and Rum Creek II, the court addressed West Virginia's
"Trespass Statute," which provided that the state's trespass law does not apply
to labor disputes,' 0 ' and West Virginia's "Neutrality Statute," which as
interpreted under official state policy meant that police could not get involved
in preventing trespasses and blockades on private property. 2 The union
blockaded the private access road to the plant and engaged in various forms of
violence, which the police refused or we're unable to stop because of these
statutes and policies. 3
The employer brought suit to enjoin enforcement of these statutes and
policies. In Rum Creek I, the court found that the Trespass Statute was
preempted under Machinists. The court concluded that part of the right to
engage in the free play of economic forces includes that the state will neutrally
enforce its laws-the Trespass Statute's exemption for labor disputes negated an
employer's ability to resist a strike by allowing the union to engage in violence
and criminal trespass during a strike."° In Rum Creek II, the court concluded
that the "Neutrality Statute" as interpreted was also preempted and issued a
96. Id. at 693.
97. Codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-15 (West 1993).
98. Louisiana's "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" is codified at La. R.S. 23:841-849 (1985).
99. Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter "Rum
Creek I"].
100. Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 971 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter "Rum
Creek IF'].
101. Rum Creek 1. 926 F.2d at 355.
102. Rum Creek 11. 971 F.2d at 1150-51.
103. Rum Creek , 926 F.2d at 356-57.
104. Id. at 364-66.
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strong proclamation of an employer's right under Machinists to neutral
enforcement of the law:
The equal playing field of labor disputes must effectively include the
reasonable protection of law and order by a disinterested and neutral
referee. Without that neutral enforcement agent, and without the
prevention of wholesale unlawful and violent activity, the free zone of
economic forces required by federal law is also an impossibility.
Accordingly, to the extent that the Neutrality Statute, as actually
interpreted, prevented the State Police from doing anything significant
in the way of enforcing the law, particularly aspects of the law
involving appellant's use of its own property, essential to a business
owner's rights to stay in business and withstand a strike, we find that
the statute is preempted by protections established in the Machinists and
Golden State opinions. Os
D. "Successor" Statutes
The NLRA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court and the NLRB, sets up a
complicated scheme for determining the extent of an acquirer's obligations to
employees who were represented by a union at the acquired company." One
thing that is clearly not required, however, is that the acquiring company assume
the CBA of the acquired company.'0 7 Economic dislocation and the takeover-
and-dismantle mania of the 1980s caused several states to pass "successor"
statutes in an attempt to overturn this rule and hold the acquirer bound by the
predecessor company's CBA.0's In United Steelworkers of America v. St.
Gabriel's Hospital0 9 and Commonwealth Edison Co. v. International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers Local Union No. 15,"' the courts found that these
statutes were preempted under the NLRA.
In St. Gabriel's Hospital, the hospital sold its kidney dialysis unit, but the
purchaser refused to agree to honor the CBA with prior unions. Minnesota's
successor statute required the purchaser to honor any CBA that has a successor-
105. Rum Creek !!, 971 F.2d at 1154.
106. For the major Supreme Court cases addressing "successorship" doctrine under the NLRA,
see NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 92 S. Ct. 1571(1972); John Wiley & Sons
v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 84 S. Ct. 909 (1964); Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint
Executive Bd. Hotel Employees, 417 U.S. 249,94 S. Ct. 2236 (1974); Fall River Dyeing & Finishing
Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 107 S. Ct. 2225 (1987).
107. E.g., Burns, 406 U.S. at 280-90, 92 S. Ct. at 1580-84.
108. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. St. Gabriel's Hosp., 871 F. Supp. 335, 338 n.3 (D.
Minn. 1994) (collecting statutes).
109. St. Gabriels Hosp., 871 F. Supp. 335.
110. 961 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. I1. 1997).
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ship clause."' The court held that this statute was preempted under Garmon
and Machinists. By forcing the CBA upon the acquiring company, the statute
violated Section 8(d) of the NLRA and was thus preempted under Garmon-the
state's asserted "local interest" in stability of employment had already been
considered in federal successorship law." 2 The statute was also preempted
under Machinists because it interfered with the free play of economic forces in
bargaining by adding substantive requirements and affecting the balance of
power-e.g., it required the new employer to accept the union as the bargaining
representative."' The court applied virtually identical reasoning in Common-
wealth Edison Co. to conclude that Illinois' successor statute was likewise
preempted under Garmon and Machinists." 4
The District of Columbia took a different tack for protecting employees
when businesses are transferred, one that was ultimately upheld in a split decision
by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The District enacted a statute
requiring service contractors to hire the predecessor's employees when they took
over a contract." 5 Under the NLRA's "successorship" doctrine, this could
force the new employer to have to bargain with the union."" In addition, the
NLRA grants a successor employer "the right not to hire any of the former...
employees, if it so desired.'" The majority of the court held that this statute
was nonetheless not preempted under Machinists because it was simply
"employee protective legislation" that may or may not have an effect on
bargaining."" The dissent believed that the statute was preempted under
Machinists because the employer has a successorship right under the NLRA to
hire who they want; thus, the statute interfered with an area that was meant to
be left to the free play of economic forces."9
E. Miscellaneous Statutes
The dislocation and harm caused by economic warfare can be more than
financial. As the "Burial Rights Act" case illustrates, even religious needs can
be adversely and substantially affected by this warfare. This act arose out of a
1992 labor dispute between a gravediggers union and twenty-six Chicago-area
cemeteries. 20 In this dispute, the gravediggers went on strike and the cemeter-
III. St. Gabriel's Hospital, 871 F. Supp. at 336-38.
112. Id. at 341-42.
113. Id. at 342-44.
114. Commonwealth Edison Co., 961 F. Supp. at 1178-84.
115. D.C. Code Ann. §§ 36-1501 to 1503 ("District of Columbia Displaced Workers Protection
Act").
116. Washington Serv. Contractors, 54 F.3d at 813, 816-17.
117. Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 262, 94 S. Ct. 2236, 2243 (1974).
118. Washington Serv. Contractors Coalition v. D.C., 54 F.3d 811, 816-18 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
119. Id. at 819-20 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
120. See Cannon v. Edgar, 33 F.3d 880, 881-82 (7th Cir. 1994).
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ies locked out the strikers, which prevented burials at those cemeteries. 2'
Judaism, Islam, and Zoroastrianism, however, require burial within a day
or two of death.' In response, the state passed the "Burial Rights Act"
requiring parties to agree to provide workers during labor disputes to bury
those whose religious faith requires their prompt burial.'23 The union
filed suit to protect their right to strike and the court held that the act
was clearly preempted under Garmon and Machinists. The Act did not fall
into Garmon's "local interest" exception because it directly invaded the
bargaining process by setting terms of the agreement.22 Likewise, the
Act violated Machinists by restricting the self-help remedy of strikes and
lockouts."'
In Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston,'26 a court
made short work of a "public safety" ordinance prohibiting the hiring of
replacement workers if a threat to public safety was likely. This ordinance
provided the threat was established either if police were deployed to the scene
of a labor dispute, or if the police commissioner determined that a threat was
likely. 2 The court held that this statute was clearly preempted under Machin-
ists: it directly interfered with an employer's right under the NLRA to hire
replacement workers. The city's "local interest" in labor peace could not justify
acting in an area Congress meant to be unregulated.
28
III. MACHINISTS PREEMPTION AND LOUISIANA LAW
Machinists preemption can be a powerful tool to protect an employer's
freedom to act in collective bargaining. It may be used offensively, by bringing
a Section 1983 suit against the governmental actor to stop the interference. 29
It may also be used defensively, to prevent an employee from bringing a claim
under state law because that claim is preempted. Unlike Garmon preemption,
Machinists preemption also may provide a basis for removal of this type of claim
121. Id.
122. Cannon v. Edgar, 33 F.3d 880, 881 (7th Cir. 1994).
123. Id. at 881.
124. Id. at 884-85.
125. Id. at 885-86.
126. 778 F. Supp. 95 (D. Mass. 1991).
127. Id. at 96.
128. Id. at 97-98.
129. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (Golden State 1H), 493 U.S. 103,
112, 110 S. Ct. 444, 452 (1989). Of course, Section 1983 suits against governmental entities or
officials often raise difficult issues regarding, for example, the Eleventh Amendment and "qualified
immunity." See, e.g., Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S. Ct. 1139 (1979) (Section 1983 does not
negate the Eleventh Amendment); Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1986) (same);
Saldana v. Garza, 684 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1982) (official protected by "qualified immunity" unless
shown he violated a "clearly established" right), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012, 103 S. Ct. 1253 (1983).
Analysis of the various issues raised by Section 1983 litigation is beyond the scope of this article.
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to federal court."' This section analyzes, from an employer's perspective, how
Machinists preemption may be applied to specific Louisiana statutes.
A. Replacement Workers Act"'
This act is the easy case for preemption. This act makes criminal (i) the
hiring of replacement workers by out-of-state recruitment firms or in-state firms
if they specialize in this area and (ii) importation of replacement workers by any
recruitment firm from out of state. 32  As cases such as Greater Boston
Chamber of Commerce illustrate, this constitutes clear and direct interference
with an employer's Machinists right to hire replacement workers. Fortunately,
the state itself appears to agree. In the only reported case that mentioned this
act, Warren v. State Dept. of Labor,3' the court noted, and the attorney general
conceded, that this act was unconstitutional because of the federal labor laws.
130. To make the case removable to federal court, the preemption at issue must be "complete
preemption"--i.e., the preemptive force of the federal statute must be so "extraordinary" that it
converts the state law claim to a federal one. E.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393,
107 S. Ct. 2425, 2430 (1987). Because Garmon preemption is based on a "primary jurisdiction"
rationale, the courts addressing this issue have held Garmon preemption does not provide "complete
preemption." E.g., Hayden v. Reickerd, 957 F.2d 1506, 1512 (9th Cir. 1992); Ethridge v. Harbor
House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1395-1401 (9th Cir. 1988). In contrast, Machinists preemption
provides a federal claim based on a federal right to be free from interference in collective bargaining.
E.g., Golden State I, 493 U.S. at 112-13, 110 S. Ct. at 451-52. The "complete preemption"
argument would be that this federal claim supplants the state law claim, converting the complaint into
one raising a "federal question." There is dicta in the Court's Caterpillar opinion that suggests this
may not always be so, see Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 397-98, 107 S. Ct. at 2432, and at least one
district court has applied this dicta to conclude removal was not proper under the NLRA preemption
doctrines. See Baldwin v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1046, 1052 (M.D. Tenn.
1996). If decision by a federal forum is of sufficient importance to the employer, the employer may
be able to avoid the uncertainty over removal jurisdiction by bringing a separate Section 1983 action
in federal court for declaratory and injunctive relief. For examples of cases in which employers have
used this approach, see Commonwealth Edison Co. v. International Broth. of Elec. Workers, 961 F.
Supp. 1169, 1172-73 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (separate suit and removal of original claim-cases then
consolidated); NBC, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 70 F.3d 69,69-70 (9th Cir. 1995) (separate suit while claims
were before state administrative agency); Bechtel Constr., Inc. v. United Broth. Carpenters & Joiners
of Am., 812 F.2d 1220, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1987) (same).
131. La. R.S. 23:900-04 (1985).
132. Section 900 provides definitions for "strikes," "lockouts," and similar terms. Section 901
provides that firms not involved in the labor dispute cannot recruit replacement workers for strike
or lockout unless (i) the recruitment firm does not specialize in recruiting replacement workers; and
(ii) that firm has been located in Louisiana for at least one year. Section 902 provides that firms not
involved in the labor dispute cannot bring replacement workers in from out of state. Section 904
exempt agricultural activities from the Act. Finally, Section 903 provides for penalties for violations
of the Act which include fines up to $1,000 or imprisonment up to one year. See La. R.S. 23:900-04
(1985).
133. 313 So. 2d 6, 8-9 (La. App. 1975). Under Garnon's "local interest" exception to prevent
violence, the court upheld Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:898, which prohibits bringing in persons
with the purpose to use force or threats to prevent picketing. Id.
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B. Apprentice Act 134
This act sets up a scheme for state regulation of apprentice agreements,
including requiring such agreements to be approved by the state director:
" Apprenticeship agreements must include terms and conditions of
employment, such as number of hours of work and wages;'3
" Director must approve "if in his opinion approval is for the best
interest of the apprentice" or inform in writing why not ap-
proved;' 36 and
* The CBA can set higher standards."'
The Bechtel case suggests that this Act may be preempted in certain
applications. Like in Bechtel, this Act does not appear to constitute "minimum
standards" legislation because of the director's discretion regarding approval and
the setting of standards. Again, like in Bechtel, requiring this approval would
itself unduly interfere with the bargaining process by directly involving the state
in the setting of the terms of a CBA."5
C. "Payment" Statutes
Title 23 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes at sections 631 to 653 provide for
various statutes regulating the payment of wages and benefits. These statutes are
"minimum labor standards" statutes that, under Metropolitan Life, are generally
not considered to raise significant preemption issues under Machinists. For
example, the "prompt payment" statute requires payment of wages within three
days of termination or fifteen days of resignation, unless the CBA provides
otherwise.' 39 This is the type of "opt out" provision found acceptable in Fort
Halifax: "If a statute that permits [no] collective bargaining on a subject escapes
NLRA pre-emption, see Metropolitan Life, surely one that permits such
bargaining cannot be pre-empted.""
Cases such as Pitta and Barnes teach, however, that even these "minimum
labor standards" statutes may be preempted as applied. For example, the "no
fines" statute prohibits the assessment of "fines" against employees or deduction
of fines from wages.' 4 ' "Fines" have been construed under Louisiana law to
134. La. kS. 23:381-92 (1985).
135. La. R.S. 23:387(4) & (6) (1985).
136. La. R.S. 23:384(BX2) & 388(A) (Supp. 1998).
137. La. S. 23:391 (1985).
138. Cf Bechtel Constr. Co. v. United Broth. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 812 F.2d 1220,
1225-26 (9th Cir. 1987).
139. La. R.S. 23:631 (Supp. 1998).
140. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S. Ct. 2211, 2223 (1987).
141. La. ILS. 23:635 (1985). The penalty for violation is criminal--i.e., a $25 to $100 fine or
thirty days to three months imprisonment. La. K.S. 23:636 (1985). The "no fines" issue typically
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be a penalty for violation of a work rule or the like.' 2 It is not difficult to
envision a situation during a labor dispute in which the employer, like the
employer in Pitta, docks an employee's wages for participation in a union work
slowdown. In this context, the employer would have a strong argument that
application of the fines statute would interfere with the employer's right to
engage in economic self-help:
The ability of an employer to deny payment to an employee who is a
mixed piece-rate/time-worker, for work wilfully not done at the
direction of his union, must be considered to be an activity meant to be
unregulated and left to the control of the free play of economic
forces. 43
D. "Whistleblower" Act
Louisiana recently enacteda "whistleblower" statute that prohibits retaliation
against an employee who, in good faith and after advising the employer of the
alleged violation of law, (i) discloses this violation or (ii) "objects to or refuses
to participate in an employment act or practice that is in violation of law."'"
Again, it is easy to envision a situation in which a union member asserts a "good
faith" belief the law requires him to follow a union's order to engage in a work
slowdown. Pitta and Barnes would suggest that the employer retains his right
under Machinists to engage in self-help by suspending or terminating the
recalcitrant employee.
IV. CONCLUSION
The cases reviewed here illustrate that social, political, and economic
pressures are continually pushing government to interfere in the collective
bargaining scheme envisioned by Congress in the NLRA and the Court in
Insurance Agents. This pressure is unlikely to' abate. As these cases further
illustrate, however, Machinists preemption remains a powerful tool to prevent
this type of government interference and to protect an employer's freedom to act
under the NLRA.
arises, however, in the civil context, where the employee asserting a claim for wages argues an
employer's deduction was invalid as an impermissible "fine."
142. E.g., Brown v. Navarre Chevrolet, Inc., 610 So. 2d 165 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993); Stell v.
Caylor, 223 So. 2d 423 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
143. Pitta v. Hotel Waldorf-Astoria Corp., 644 F. Supp. 844, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
144. La. R.S. 23:967 (Supp. 1998).
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